Directed fuzzing focuses on automatically testing specific parts of the code by taking advantage of additional information such as (partial) bug stack trace, patches or risky operations. Key applications include bug reproduction, patch testing and static analysis report verification. Although directed fuzzing has received a lot of attention recently, hard-to-detect vulnerabilities such as Use-After-Free (UAF) are still not well addressed, more especially at the binary level. We propose UAFUZZ, the first (binary-level) directed greybox fuzzer dedicated to UAF bugs. The technique features a fuzzing engine tailored to UAF specifics, a lightweight code instrumentation and an efficient bug triage step. Experimental evaluation for bug reproduction on real cases demonstrates that UAFUZZ significantly outperforms state-of-the-art directed fuzzers in terms of fault detection rate, time to exposure and bug triaging. UAFUZZ has also been proven effective in patch testing, leading to the discovery of 20 new bugs in Perl, GPAC and GNU Patch (including a buggy patch) -all of them have been acknowledged and 14 have been fixed. Last but not least, we provide to the community the first fuzzing benchmark dedicated to UAF, built on both real codes and real bugs.
Introduction
Context. Most programs contain bugs, which can in turn become vulnerabilities. Finding bugs early is therefore crucial in the vulnerability management process. The recent rise of fuzzing [50, 53] in both academia and industry, such as Microsoft's Springfield [52] and Google's OSS-FUZZ [15] , shows its ability to find various types of bugs in real-world applications. Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing (CGF), such as AFL [1] and LIBFUZZER [14] , leverages code coverage information in order to guide input generation toward new parts of the program under test (PUT), exploring as many program states as possible in the hope of triggering crashes. On the other hand, Directed Greybox Fuzzing (DGF) [25, 28] aims to perform stress testing on pre-selected potentially vul-nerable target locations, with applications to different security contexts: (1) bug reproduction [25, 28, 42, 61] , (2) patch testing [25, 51, 59] or (3) static analysis report verification [31, 49] . Depending on the application, target locations are originated from bug stack traces, patches or static analysis reports.
We focus mainly on bug reproduction, which is the most common practical application of DGF [25, 28, 42, 49, 74] . It consists in generating Proof-of-Concept (PoC) inputs of disclosed vulnerabilities given bug report information. It is especially needed since only 54.9% of usual bug reports can be reproduced due to missing information and users' privacy violation [54] . Even with a PoC provided in the bug report, developers may still need to consider all corner cases of the bug in order to avoid regression bugs or incomplete fixes. In this case, providing more bug-triggering inputs becomes important to facilitate and accelerate the repair process. Bug stack traces, sequences of function calls at the time a bug is triggered, are widely used for guiding directed fuzzers [25, 28, 42, 49] . Running a code on a PoC input under profiling tools like AddressSanitizer (ASan) [65] or VALGRIND [55] will output such a bug stack trace.
Problem. Despite tremendous progress in the past few years [5, 21, 23, 25, 28, 29, 39, 46, 47, 60, 62, 68, 73] , current (directed or not) greybox fuzzers still have a hard time finding complex vulnerabilities such as Use-After-Free (UAF), noninterference or flaky bugs [24] , which require bug-triggering paths satisfying very specific properties. For example, OSS-FUZZ [15, 16] or recent greybox fuzzers [25, 62, 73] only found a small number of UAF. Actually, RODE0DAY [17] , a continuous bug finding competition, recognizes that fuzzers should aim to cover new bug classes like UAF in the future [37] , moving further from the widely-used LAVA [36] bug corpora which only contains buffer overflows.
We focus on UAF bugs. They appear when a heap element is used after having been freed. The numbers of UAF bugs has increased in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [20] . They are currently identified as one of the most critical exploitable vulnerabilities due to the lack of mitigation techniques compared to other types of bugs, and they may have serious consequences such as data corruption, information leaks and denial-of-service attacks.
Goal and challenges. We focus on the problem of designing an efficient directed fuzzing method tailored for UAF. The technique must also be able to work at binary-level (no sourcelevel instrumentation), as source codes of security-critical programs are not always available or may rely partly on thirdparty libraries. However, fuzzers targeting the detection of UAF bugs confront themselves with the following challenges. C1. Complexity -Exercising UAF bugs require to generate inputs triggering a sequence of 3 events -alloc, free and use -on the same memory location, spanning multiple functions of the PUT, where buffer overflows only require a single out-of-bound memory access. This combination of both temporal and spatial constraints is extremely difficult to meet in practice; C2. Silence -UAF bugs often have no observable effect, such as segmentation faults. In this case, fuzzers simply observing crashing behaviors do not detect that a test case triggered such a memory bug. Sadly, popular profiling tools such as ASan or VALGRIND cannot be used in a fuzzing context due to their high runtime overhead. Actually, current state-of-the-art directed fuzzers, namely AFLGO [25] and HAWKEYE [28] , fail to address these challenges. First, they are too generic and therefore do not cope with the specificities of UAF such as temporality -their guidance metrics do not consider any notion of sequenceness. Second, they are completely blind to UAF bugs, requiring to send all the many generated seeds to a profiling tool for an expensive extra check. Third, they instrument source code and are therefore unadapted to detecting bugs in closed-source executables. Finally, current implementations of source-based DGF fuzzers typically suffer from an expensive instrumentation step [3] , e.g., AFLGO spent nearly 2h compiling and instrumenting cxxfilt (Binutils).
Proposal. To address the above limitations, we propose UA-FUZZ, the first (binary-level) directed greybox fuzzer tailored to UAF bugs. A quick comparison of UAFUZZ with existing greybox fuzzers in terms of UAF is presented in Table 1. While we follow mostly the generic scheme of directed fuzzing, we carefully tune several of its key components to the specifics of UAF:
• the distance metric favors shorter call chains leading to the target functions that are more likely to include both allocation and free functions -where soa directed fuzzers simply rely on a generic CFG-based distance;
• seed selection is now based on a sequenceness-aware target similarity metric -where soa directed fuzzers rely at best on target coverage; • our power schedule benefits from these new metrics, plus another one called cut-edges favoring prefix paths more likely to reach the whole target. Finally, the bug triaging step piggy-backs on our previous metrics to pre-identifies seeds as likely-bugs or not, sparing a huge amount of queries to the profiling tool for confirmation (VALGRIND in our implementation).
Contributions. Our contribution is the following:
• We design the first directed greybox fuzzing technique tailored to UAF bugs working directly on executables (Section 4). Especially, we systematically revisit the three main ingredients of directed fuzzing (selection heuristic, power schedule, input metrics) and specialize them to UAF. Experiments demonstrate that these improvements are beneficial and complementary; • We develop a toolchain on top of the state-of-the-art greybox fuzzer AFL [1] and the binary analysis platform BINSEC [4] , named UAFUZZ, implementing the above method for UAF directed fuzzing over binary codes (Section 5) and enjoying both small instrumentation-and runtime-overheads; • We construct and openly release the first fuzzing benchmark dedicated to UAF [19] , comprising 14 real bugs from 12 widely-used projects (including the few previous UAF bugs found by directed fuzzers), in the hope of facilitating future UAF fuzzing evaluation ( §6.2); • We evaluate our technique and tool in a bug reproduction setting (Section 6), demonstrating that UAFUZZ is highly effective and significantly outperforms state-ofthe-art competitors: 2× faster in average to trigger bugs (up to 43×), +34% more successful runs in average (up to +300%) and 17× faster in triaging bugs (up to 130×, with 99% spare checks); • Finally, UAFUZZ is also proven effective in patch testing ( §6.7), leading to the discovery of 20 previous unknown bugs in security-critical projects like Perl, GPAC and GNU Patch (including a buggy patch). All of them have been acknowledged, 14 have been fixed.
UAFUZZ is the first directed greybox fuzzing approach tailored to detecting UAF vulnerabilities (in binary) given only bug stack traces. UAFUZZ outperforms existing directed fuzzers on this class of vulnerabilities for bug reproduction and encouraging results have been obtained as well on patch testing. We believe that our approach may also be useful in slightly related contexts, for example partial bug reports from static analysis or other classes of vulnerabilities.
Background
Let us first clarify some notions used along the paper.
Use-After-Free
Execution. An execution is the complete sequence of states executed by the program on an input. An execution trace crashes when it ends with a visible error. The standard goal of fuzzers is to find inputs leading to crashes, as crashes are the first step toward exploitable vulnerabilities. Memory safety errors. This is in particular the case for memory safety violations. Those can be split into two categories [67] . Spatial safety violations, like buffer overflows, happen when dereferencing a pointer out of the bounds of its intended pointed object. Current fuzzers [1, 14] have shown to be very effective in finding such errors. Temporal safety violations happen when dereferencing a pointer to an object which is no longer valid (i.e., the pointer is dangling). Observing a good stack discipline is usually easy and suffices to avoid bugs involving pointer to stack objects. Thus, the most serious temporal memory violation include pointers to objects allocated on the heap; those are called Use-After-Free (UAF) bugs, of which Double-Free (DF) is a special case. UAF-triggering conditions. Triggering a UAF bug requires to find an input whose execution covers in sequence three UAF events: an allocation (alloc), a free and a use (typically, a dereference), all three referring to the same memory object, as shown in Listing 1.
Furthermore, this last use generally does not make the execution immediately crash, as a memory violation crashes a process only when it accesses an address outside of the address space of the process, which is unlikely with a dangling pointer. Thus, UAF bugs go often unnoticed and are a good vector of exploitation [45, 75] .
Stack traces and bug traces
By inspection of the state of a process we can extract a stack trace, i.e. the list of the function calls active in that state. Stack traces are easily obtained from a process when it crashes. As they provide (partial) information about the sequence of program locations leading to a crash, they are extremely valuable for bug reproduction [25, 28, 42, 49] .
Yet, as crashes caused by UAF bugs may happen long after the UAF happened, standard stack traces usually do not help in reproducing UAF bugs. Hopefully, profiling tools for dynamically detecting memory corruptions, such as ASan [65] or VALGRIND [55] , record the stack traces of all memoryrelated events: when they detect that an object is used after being freed, they actually report three stack traces (when the object is allocated, when it is freed and when it is used after being freed). We call such a sequence of three stack traces a (UAF) bug trace. When we use a bug trace as an input to try to reproduce the bug, we call such a bug trace a target. 
Directed Greybox Fuzzing
Fuzzing [50, 53] consists in stressing a code under test through massive input generation in order to find bugs. While original approaches where completely blackbox and more or less akin to massive random testing, recent coverage-based greybox fuzzers (CGF) [1, 14] rely on lightweight program analysis to guide the search -typically through coverage-based feedback. Roughly speaking, a seed (input) is favored (selected) when it reaches under-explored parts of the code, and such favored seeds are then mutated to create new seeds for the code to be executed on. As the name suggests, CGF is geared toward covering a given code in the large, in the hope of finding unknown vulnerabilities.
On the other hand, directed greybox fuzzing (DGF) [25, 28] aims at reaching a pre-identified potentially buggy part of the code from a target (e.g., patch, static analysis report), as often and fast as possible. Directed fuzzers follow the general principles and architecture as CGF, but adapt the key components to their goal, essentially favoring seeds "closer" to the target. Overall directed fuzzers 1 are built upon three main steps: (1) instrumentation (distance pre-computation), (2) fuzzing (including seed selection, power schedule and seed mutation) and (3) triage.
The standard core algorithm of DGF is presented in Algorithm 1 (the parts we modify in UAFUZZ are in gray). Given a program P, a set of initial seeds S 0 and a target T , the algorithm outputs a set of bug-triggering inputs S . The fuzzing queue S is initialized with the initial seeds in S 0 (line 1).
1. DGF first performs a static analysis (e.g., target distance computation for each basic block) and insert the instrumentation for dynamic coverage or distance information (line 2); 2. The fuzzer then repeatedly mutates inputs s chosen from the fuzzing queue S (line 4) until a timeout is reached. An input is selected either if it is favored (i.e., believed to be interesting) or with a small probablity α (line 5). Subsequently, DGF assigns the energy (a.k.a, the number M of mutants to be created) to the selected seed s (line 6). Then, the fuzzer generates M new inputs by randomly applying some predefined mutation operators on seed s (line 8) and monitors their executions (line 9). If the generated mutant s crashes the program, it is added to the set S of crashing inputs (line 11). Also, newly generated mutants are added to the fuzzing queue 2 (line 13); 3. Finally, DGF returns S as the set of bug-triggering inputs (triage does nothing in standard DGF) (line 14). AFLGO [25] was the first to propose a CFG-based distance to evaluate the proximity between a seed execution and multiple targets, together with a simulated annealing-based power schedule. HAWKEYE [28] keeps the CFG-based view but improves its accuracy 3 , brings a seed selection heuristic partly based on target coverage (seen as a set of locations) and proposes adaptive mutations.
Algorithm 1: Directed Greybox Fuzzing

Motivation
The toy example in Listing 2 contains a UAF bug due to a missing exit() call, a common root cause in such bugs (e.g., CVE-2014-9296, CVE-2015-7199). The program reads a file and copies its contents into a buffer buf. Specifically, a memory chunk pointed at by p is allocated (line 12), then p_alias and p become aliased (line 15). The memory pointed by both pointers is freed in function bad_func (line 10). The UAF bug occurs when the freed memory is dereferenced again via p_alias (line 19).
Bug-triggering conditions. The UAF bug is triggered iff the first three bytes of the input are 'AFU'. To quickly detect this bug, fuzzers need to explore the right path through the if part of conditional statements in lines 13, 5 and 18 in order to cover in sequence the three UAF events alloc, free and use respectively. It is worth noting that this UAF bug does not make the program crash, hence existing greybox fuzzers without sanitization will not detect this memory error.
Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing. Starting with an empty seed, AFL quickly generates 3 new inputs (e.g., 'AAAA', 'FFFF' and 'UUUU') triggering individually the 3 UAF events. None of these seeds triggers the bug. As the probability of generating an input starting with 'AFU' from an empty seed is extremely small, the coverage-guided mechanism is not effective here in tracking a sequence of UAF events even though each individual event is easily triggered.
Directed Greybox Fuzzing. Given a bug trace (14 -alloc, 17, 6, 3 -free, 19 -use) generated for example by ASan, DGF prevents the fuzzer from exploring undesirable paths, e.g., the else part at line 7 in function func, in case the condition at line 5 is more complex. Still, directed fuzzers have their own blind spots. For example, standard DGF seed selection mechanisms favor a seed whose execution trace covers many locations in targets, instead of trying to reach these locations in a given order. For example, regarding a target (A, F, U), standard DGF distances [25, 28] do not discriminate between an input s 1 covering a path A → F → U and another input s 2 covering U → A → F. The lack of ordering in exploring target locations makes UAF bug detection very challenging for existing directed fuzzers. Another example: the power function proposed by HAWKEYE [28] may assign much energy to a seed whose trace does not reach the target function, implying that it could get lost on the toy example in the else part at line 7 in function func.
A glimpse at UAFUZZ. We rely in particular on modifying the seed selection heuristic w.r.t. the number of targets covered by an execution trace ( §4.2) and bringing target orderingaware seed metrics to DGF ( §4.3).
On the toy example, UAFUZZ generates inputs to progress towards the expected target sequences. For example, in the same fuzzing queue containing 4 inputs, the mutant 'AFAA', generated by mutating the seed 'AAAA', is discarded by AFL as it does not increase code coverage. However, since it has maximum value of target similarity metric score (i.e., 4 targets including lines 14, 17, 6, 3) compared to all 4 previous inputs in the queue (their scores are 0 or 2), this mutant is selected by UAFUZZ for subsequent fuzzing campaigns. By continuing to fuzz 'AFAA', UAFUZZ eventually produces a bug-triggering input, e.g., 'AFUA'.
Evaluation. AFLGO (source-level, with bug trace) cannot detect the UAF bug within 2 hours 45 , while UAFUZZ (binarylevel, with bug trace) is able to trigger it within 20 minutes. Also, while UAFUZZ identifies a single potentially buggy input (the right PoC input!) and sends it to VALGRIND for confirmation, AFLGO sends 120 inputs to the bug triager.
The UAFUZZ Approach
UAFUZZ is made out of several components encompassing seed selection ( §4.2), input metrics ( §4.3), power schedule ( §4.4), and seed triage ( §4.5). Before detailing these aspects, let us start with an overview of the approach. We aim to find an input fulfilling both control-flow (temporal) and runtime (spatial) conditions to trigger the UAF bug. We solve this problem by bringing UAF characteristics into 4 AFL-QEMU did not succeed either. 5 HAWKEYE is not available and thus could not be tested.
DGF in order to generate more potential inputs reaching targets in sequence w.r.t. the UAF expected bug trace. Figure 2 depicts the general picture. Especially:
• We propose three dynamic seed metrics specialized for UAF vulnerabilities detection. The distance metric approximates how close a seed is to all target locations ( §4.3), and takes into account the need for the seed execution trace to cover the three UAF events in order. The cut-edge coverage metric ( §4.4.1) measures the ability of a seed to take the correct decision at important decision nodes. Finally, the target similarity metric concretely assesses how many targets a seed execution trace covers at runtime ( §4.2.2); • Our seed selection strategy ( §4.2) favors seeds covering more targets at runtime. The power scheduler determining the energy for each selected seed based on its metric scores during the fuzzing process is detailed in §4.4; • Finally, we take advantage of our previous metrics to pre-identify likely-PoC inputs that are sent to a profiling tool (here VALGRIND) for bug confirmation, avoiding many useless checks ( §4.5).
Bug-trace flattening
A bug trace ( §2.2) is a sequence of stack traces, i.e. it is a large object not fit for the lightweight instrumentation required by greybox fuzzing. The most valuable information that we need to extract from a bug trace is the sequence of basic blocks (and functions) that were traversed, which is an easier object to work with. We call this extraction bug-trace flattening.
The operation works as follows. First, each of the three stack-traces is seen as a path in a call tree; we thus merge all the stack traces to re-create that tree. Some of the nodes in the tree have several children; we make sure that the children are ordered according to the ordering of the UAF events (i.e. the child coming from the alloc event comes before the child coming from the free event). Figure 3 shows an example of tree for the bug trace given in Figure 1 Figure 1 ). The preorder traversal of this tree is simply 0 → 1 → 2 → 3(n alloc ) → 4(n f ree ) → 5 → 6(n use ).
Finally, we perform a preorder traversal of this tree to get a sequence of target locations (and their associated functions), which we will use in the following algorithms.
Seed Selection based on target similarity
Fuzzers generate a large number of inputs so that smartly selecting the seed from the fuzzing queue to be mutated in the next fuzzing campaign is crucial for effectiveness. Our seed selection algorithm is based on two insights. First, we should prioritize seeds that are most similar to the target bug trace, as the goal of a directed fuzzer is to find bugs covering the target bug trace. Second, target similarity should take ordering (a.k.a. sequenceness) into account, as traces covering sequentially a number of locations in the target bug trace are closer to the target than traces covering the same locations in an arbitrary order.
Seed selection
Definition 1. A max-reaching input is an input s whose execution trace is the most similar to the target bug trace T so far, where most similar means "having the highest value as compared by a target similarity metric t(s, T )". We mostly select and mutate max-reaching inputs during the fuzzing process. Nevertheless, we also need to improve code coverage, thus UAFUZZ also selects inputs that cover new paths, with a small probability α (Algorithm 1). In our experiments, the probability of selecting the remaining inputs in the fuzzing queue that are less favored is 1% like AFL [1] .
Target similarity metrics
A target similarity metric t(s, T ) measures the similarity between the execution of a seed s and the target UAF bug trace T . We define 4 such metrics, based on whether we consider ordering of the covered targets in the bug trace (P), or not (B) -P stands for Prefix, B for Bag; and whether we consider the full trace, or only the three UAF events (3T ): 
These 4 metrics have different degrees of precision. A metric t is said more precise than a metric t if, for any two seeds s 1 and s 2 : 
Combining target similarity metrics
Using a precise metric such as P allows to better assess progression towards the goal. In particular, P can distinguish seeds that match the target bug trace from those that do not, while other metrics cannot. On the other hand, a less precise metric provides information that precise metrics do not have. For instance, P does not measure any difference between traces whose suffix would match the target bug trace, but who would diverge from the target trace on the first locations (like 'UUU' and 'UFU' on Listing 2), while B can. To take benefit from both precise and imprecise metrics, we combine them using a lexicographical order. Hence, the P-3TP-B metric is defined as:
to the target, then s is close to an input that would cover the target, which makes s an interesting seed. In existing directed greybox fuzzers [2, 28] , the seed distance is computed to a target which is a single location or a set of locations. This is not appropriate for the reproduction of UAF bugs, that must go through 3 different locations in sequence. Thus, we propose to modify the seed distance computation to take into account the need to reach the locations in order.
Zoom: background on seed distances
Existing directed greybox fuzzers [2, 28] compute the distance d(s, T ) from a seed s to a target T as follows.
AFLGO's seed distance [2] . The seed distance d(s, T ) is defined as the (arithmetic) mean of the basic-block distances d b (m, T ), for each basic block m in the execution trace of s.
The basic-block distance d b (m, T ) is defined using the length of the intra-procedural shortest path from m to the basic block of a "call" instruction, using the CFG of the function containing m; and the length of the inter-procedural shortest path from the function containing m to the target functions T f (in our case, T f is the function where the use event happens), using the call graph.
HAWKEYE's enhancement [28] . The main factor in this seed distance computation is computing distance between functions in the call graph. To compute this, AFLGO uses the original call graph with every edge having weight 1. HAWKEYE improves this computation by proposing the augmented adjacent-function distance (AAFD), which changes the edge weight from a caller function f a and a callee f b to w Hawkeye ( f a , f b ). The idea is to favor edges in the call graph where the callee can be called in a variety of situations, i.e. appear several times at different locations.
Our UAF-based seed distance
Previous seed distances [2, 28] do not account for any order among the target locations, while it is essential for UAF. We address this issue by modifying the distance between functions in the call graph to favor paths that sequentially go through the three UAF events alloc, free and use of the bug trace. This is done by decreasing the weight of the edges in the call graph that are likely to be between these events, using lightweight static analysis.
This analysis first computes R alloc , R f ree , and R use , i.e., the sets of functions that can call respectively the alloc, free, or use function in the bug trace -the use function is the one where the use event happens. Then, we consider each call edge between f a and f b as indicating a direction: either downward ( f a executes, then calls f b ), or upward ( f b is called, then f a is executed). Using this we compute, for each direction, how many events in sequence can be covered by going through the edge in that direction. For instance, if f a ∈ R alloc and allows to cover the three UAF events in sequence. To find double free, we also include, in this computation, call edges that allow to reach two free events in sequence. Then, we favor a call edge from f a to f b by decreasing its weight, based on how many events in sequence the edge allows to cover. In our experiments, we use the following
2 UAF events in sequence 1 otherwise Figure 5 presents an example of call graph with edges favored using the above Θ UAF function.
Finally, we combine our edge weight modification with that of HAWKEYE:
Like AFLGO, we favor the shortest path leading to the targets, since it is more likely to involve only a small number of control flow constraints, making it easier to cover by fuzzing. Our distance-based technique therefore considers both calling relations in general, via w Hawkeye , and calling relations covering UAF events in sequence, via Θ UAF .
Power Schedule
Coverage-guided fuzzers employ a power schedule (or energy assignment) to determine the number of extra inputs to generate from a selected input, which is called the energy of the seed. It measures how long we should spend fuzzing a particular seed. While AFL [1] mainly uses execution trace characteristics such as trace size, execution speed of the PUT and time added to the fuzzing queue for seed energy allocation, recent work [26, 48, 62] including both directed and coverage-guided fuzzing propose different power schedules. AFLGO employs simulated annealing to assign more energy for seeds closer to target locations (using the seed distance), while HAWKEYE accounts for both shorter and longer traces leading to the targets via a power schedule based on trace distance and similarity at function level.
We propose here a new power schedule using the intuitions that we should assign more energy to seeds in these cases: • seeds that are closer (using the seed distance, Section 4.3.2); • seeds that are more similar to the target (using the target similarity, Section 4.2.2); • seeds that make better decisions at critical code junctions.
We define hereafter a new metric to evaluate the latter case.
Cut-edge Coverage Metric
To track progress of a seed during the fuzzing process, a fine-grained approach would consist in instrumenting the execution to compare the similarity of the execution trace of the current seed with the target bug trace, at the basic block level. But this method would slow down the fuzzing process due to high runtime overhead, especially for large programs. A more coarse-grained approach, on the other hand, is to measure the similarity at function level as proposed in HAWKEYE [28] . However, a callee can occur multiple times from different locations of single caller. Also, reaching a target function does not mean reaching the target basic blocks in this function. Thus, we propose the lightweight cut-edge coverage metric, hitting a middle ground between the two aforementioned approaches by measuring progress at the edge level but on the critical decision nodes only.
Definition 2.
A cut edge between two basic blocks source and sink is an outgoing edge of a decision node so that there exists a path starting from source, going through this edge and reaching sink. A non-cut edge is an edge which is not a cut-edge, i.e. for which there is no path from source to sink that go through this edge. Algorithm 3 shows how cut/non-cut edges are identified in UAFUZZ given a tested binary program and an expected UAF bug trace. The main idea is to identify and accumulate the cut edges between all consecutive nodes in the (flattened) bug trace. For instance in the bug trace of Figure 3 , we would first compute the cut edges between 0 and 1, then those between 1 and 2, etc. As the bug trace is a sequence of stack traces, most of the locations in the trace are "call" events, and we compute the cut edge from the function entry point to the call event in that function. However, because of the flattening, sometimes we have to compute the cut edges between different points in the same function (e.g. if in the bug trace the same function is calling alloc and free, we would have to compute the edge from the call to alloc to the call to free).
Algorithm 4 describes how cut-edges are computed inside a single function. First we have to collect the decision nodes, i.e. conditional jumps between the source and sink basic blocks. This can be achieved using a simple data-flow analysis. For each outgoing edge of the decision node, we check whether they allow to reach the sink basic block; those that can are cut edges, and the others are non-cut edges. Note that this program analysis is intra-procedural, so that we do not need construct an inter-procedural CFG.
Our heuristic is that an input exercising more cut edges and fewer non-cut edges is more likely to cover more locations of the target. Let E cut (T ) be the set of all cut edges of a program given the expected UAF bug trace T . We define the cut-edge score e s (s, T ) of seed s as where hit(e) denotes the number of times an edge e is exercised, and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the weight penalizing seeds covering non-cut edges. In our main experiments, we use δ = 0.5 according to our preliminary experiments. To deal with the path explosion induced by loops, we also use bucketing as done in AFL [1] (i.e., the hit count is bucketized to small powers of two).
Energy assignment
We propose a power schedule function that assigns energy to a seed using a combination of the three metrics that we have proposed: the prefix target similarity metric t P (s, T ) (Section 4.2.2), the UAF-based seed distance d(s, T ) (Section 4.3.2), and the cut-edge coverage metric e s (s, T ) (Section 4.4.1). The idea of our power schedule is to assign energy to a seed s proportionally to the number of targets covered in sequence t P (s, T ), with a corrective factor based on seed distance d and cut-edge coverage e s . Indeed, our power func-tion (corresponding to ASSIGN_ENERGY in Algorithm 1) is defined as:
Because their actual value is not as meaningful as the length of the covered prefix, but they allow to rank the seeds, we apply a min-max normalization [2] to get a normalized seed distance (d s (s, T )) and normalized cut-edge score (ẽ s (s, T )). For example,d s (s, T ) = d s (s,T )−minD maxD−minD where minD, maxD denote the minimum and maximum value of seed distance so far. Note that both metric scores are in (0, 1), i.e. can only reduce the assigned energy when there score is bad.
Postprocess and Bug Triage
Since UAF bugs are often silent, all seeds generated by a directed fuzzer must a priori be sent to a bug triager (typically, a profiling tool such as VALGRIND) in order to confirm whether they are bug triggering input or not. Yet, this can be extremely expensive as fuzzers generate a huge amount of seeds and bug triagers are expensive.
Fortunately, the target similarity metric allows UAFUZZ to compute the sequence of covered targets of each fuzzed input at runtime. This information is available for free for each seed once it has been created and executed. We capitalize on it in order to pre-identify likely-bug triggering seeds, i.e. seeds that indeed cover the three UAF events in sequence. Then, the bug triager is run only over these pre-identified seeds, the other ones being simply discarded -potentially saving a huge amount of time in bug triaging.
Implementation
Static Analysis Figure 6 : Overview of UAFUZZ workflow.
We implement our results in a UAF-oriented binary-level directed fuzzer named UAFUZZ. Figure 6 depicts an overview of the main components of UAFUZZ. The input of the overall system are a set of initial seeds, the PUT in binary and target locations extracted from the bug trace. The output is a set of unique bug-triggering inputs.
The prototype is built upon AFL 2.52b [1] and QEMU 2.10.0 for fuzzing, and the binary analysis platform BIN-SEC [4] for (lightweight) static analysis.
These two main components share information such as target locations, time budget and fuzzing status.
• We have implemented a BINSEC plugin computing statically distance and cut-edge information, consequently used in the instrumentation of UAFUZZ-note that call graph and CFG are retrieved from the IDA PRO binary database (IDA PRO version 6.9 [13]); • On the dynamic side, we have modified AFL-QEMU to track covered targets, dynamically compute seed scores and power functions; • In the end, a small script automates bug triaging.
Memory overhead. UAFUZZ uses 20 additional bytes of shared memory at runtime (per execution): like state-of-theart source-based DGF we use 8 bytes to accumulate the distance values and 8 bytes to record the number of exercised basic blocks to store the current seed distance, plus 4 extra bytes for the current seed target trace.
6 Experimental Evaluation
Research Questions
To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our approach, we investigate four principal research questions: RQ1. UAF Bug-reproducing Ability Can UAFUZZ outperform other directed fuzzing techniques in terms of UAF bug reproducion in executables? RQ2. UAF Overhead How does UAFUZZ compare to other directed fuzzing approaches w.r.t. instrumentation time and runtime overheads? RQ3. UAF Triage How much does UAFUZZ reduce the number of inputs to be sent to the bug triage step? RQ4. Individual Contribution How much does each of its individual components contribute to the overall results of UAFUZZ? While the first three questions assess the fuzzing performance of UAFUZZ compared to existing directed fuzzing techniques, the last one aims at a finer evaluation of the principles behind UAFUZZ. Finally, we will also evaluate UAFUZZ in the context of patch testing, as it is another important application of directed fuzzing.
Evaluation Setup
Evaluation Fuzzers. We aim to compare UAFUZZ with stateof-the-art directed fuzzers, namely AFLGO [2] and HAWK-EYE [28] , using AFL-QEMU as a baseline (binary-level coverage-based fuzzing). Unfortunately, both AFLGO and HAWKEYE work on source code, and while AFLGO is open source, HAWKEYE is not available. Hence, we implemented binary-level versions of AFLGO and HAWKEYE, coined as AFLGOB and HAWKEYEB. We closely follow the original papers, and, for AFLGO, use the source code as a reference. Basically, AFLGOB and HAWKEYEB are implemented on top of AFL-QEMU, following the generic architecture of UAFUZZ but with dedicated distance, seed selection and power schedule mechanisms. Table 2 summarizes our different fuzzer implementations and a comparison with their original counterparts. We evaluate the implementation of AFLGOB ( §6.3) and find it very close to the original AFLGO after accounting for emulation overhead. UAF Fuzzing Benchmark. The standard UAF micro benchmark Juliet Test Suite [56] for static analyzers is too simple for fuzzing. No macro benchmark actually assesses the effectiveness of UAF detectors -the widely used LAVA [36] only contains buffer overflows. Thus, we construct a new UAF benchmark according to the following rational:
1. The subjects are real-world popular and fairly large security-critical programs; 2. The benchmark includes UAF bugs found by existing fuzzers from the fuzzing litterature [1, 26, 28, 40] or collected from NVD [20] . Especially, we include all UAF bugs found by directed fuzzers; 3. The bug report provides detailed information (e.g., buggy version and the stack trace), so that we can identify target locations for fuzzers. In summary, we have 14 UAF vulnerabilities (2 from directed fuzzers) over 12 real-world C programs whose sizes vary from 26 Kb to 3.8 Mb. Furthermore, selected programs range from image processing to data archiving, video processing and web development. Our benchmark is therefore representative of different UAF vulnerabilities of real-world programs. Table 3 gives an overview of our benchmark (more details in Appendix A, Table 5 ). Also, Table 4 in Section 7 provides a comparison with existing fuzzing benchmarks. Note that we do not use CVE-2015-5221 (Jasper) in our experiments, as a magic byte comparison makes it either too hard (no dictionary, within 24 hours) or too easy (using valid MIF seeds) for all tested directed fuzzers. Evaluation Configurations. We follow the recommendations for fuzzing evaluations [43] and use the same fuzzing configurations and hardware resources for all experiments. Experiments are conducted 10 times with a time budget depending on the PUT as shown in Table 5 . We use as input seed either an empty file or existing valid files provided by developers. We do not use any token dictionary. All experiments were carried out on an Intel Xeon CPU E3-1505M v6 @ 3.00GHz CPU with 32GB RAM and Ubuntu 16.04 64-bit operating system.
UAF Bug-reproducing Ability (RQ1)
Protocol. We compare the different fuzzers on our 13 UAF vulnerabilities (recall Jasper is not used) using Time-to-Exposure (TTE), i.e. the time elapsed until first bug-triggering input, and number of success runs in which a fuzzer triggers the bug. In case a fuzzer cannot detect the bug within the time budget, the run's TTE is set to the time budget. Following existing work [25, 28] , we use the Vargha-Delaney statistic (Â 12 ) metric [70] 6 to assess the confidence that one tool outperforms another. Note that code coverage is not relevant to evaluate directed fuzzers' capabilities.
Results. Figure 7 presents a consolidated view of the results (total success runs and TTE -we denote by µTTE the average TTE observed for each sample over 10 runs). Appendix B contains additional information: detailed statistics per benchmark sample (Table 8) in TTE (vs. 2nd best AFLGOB, total: 2.0×, avg: 6.7×, max: 43×). In some specific cases (see Table 8 ), UAFUZZ saves roughly 10,000s of TTE over AFLGOB or goes from 0/10 successes to 7/10. TheÂ 12 value of UAFUZZ against other fuzzers is also significantly above the conventional large effect size 0.71 [70] , as shown in Table 6 (vs. 2nd best AFLGOB, avg: 0.78, median: 0.80, min: 0.52). Figure 18 (Appendix) finally shows UAFUZZ to have more stable performance.
UAFUZZ significantly outperforms state-of-the-art directed fuzzers in terms of UAF bugs reproduction with a high confidence level.
Remark: we can note that HAWKEYEB performs significantly worse than AFLGOB and UAFUZZ here. We investigate that point and found that this is mostly due to a large runtime overhead spent calculating the target similarity metric. Indeed, according to the HAWKEYE original paper [28] , this computation involves some quadratic computation over the total number of functions in the code under test. On our samples this number quickly becomes important (up to 772) while the number of targets (UAFUZZ) remains small (up to 28). A few examples: CVE-2017-10686: 772 functions vs 10 targets; gifsicle-issue-122: 516 functions vs 11 targets; mjs-issue-78: 450 functions vs 19 targets. Aside: comparison with source-based AFLGO. We want to evaluate how close our implementation of AFLGOB is from the original AFLGO, in order to assess the degree of confidence we can have in our results -we do not do it for HAWKEYEB as HAWKEYE is not available. AFLGO unsurprisingly performs better than AFLGOB and UAFUZZ (Figure 8 , Table 7 in Appendix). This is largely due to the emulation runtime overhead of QEMU, a welldocumented fact. Still, surprisingly enough, UAFUZZ can find the bugs faster than AFLGO in 4 samples, demonstrating its efficiency.
Yet, more interestingly, Figure 8 also shows that once emulation overhead 7 is taken into account (yielding AFLGO F , the expected binary-level performance of AFLGO), then 7 We estimate for each sample an overhead factor f by comparing the number of executions per second in both AFL and AFL-QEMU, then multiply the computation time of AFLGO by f -f varies from 2.05 to 22.5 in our samples. AFLGOB is in line with AFLGO F (and even shows better TTE) -UAFUZZ even significantly outperforms AFLGO F .
Performance of AFLGOB is in line with the original AFLGO once QEMU overhead is taken into account, allowing a fair comparison with UAFUZZ. UAFUZZ nonetheless performs relatively well on UAF compared with the source-based directed fuzzer AFLGO, demonstrating the benefit of our original fuzzing mechanisms.
UAF Overhead (RQ2)
Protocol. We are interested in both (1) instrumentation-time overhead and (2) runtime overhead. For (1), we simply compute the total instrumentation time of UAFUZZ and we compare it to the instrumentation time of AFLGO. For (2), we compute the total number of executions per second of UA-FUZZ and compare it AFL-QEMU taken as a baseline.
Results. Consolidated results for both instrumentation-time and runtime overhead are presented in Figure 9 (number of executions per second is replaced by the total number of executions performed in the same time budget). Additional results (Appendix C) contain detailed instrumentation time ( Figure 13 ) and runtime statistics (Figure 15 ), as well as instrumentation time for AFLGOB and HAWKEYEB ( Figure 14 ).
• Figures 9 and 13 show that UAFUZZ is an order of magnitude faster than the state-of-the-art source-based directed fuzzer AFLGO in the instrumentation phase (14.7× faster in total). For example, UAFUZZ spends only 23s (i.e., 64× less than AFLGO) in processing the large program readelf of Binutils; • Figures 9 and 15 show that UAFUZZ has almost the same total number of executions per second as AFL-QEMU (-4% in total, -12% in average), meaning that its overhead is negligible. Detailed results (Appendix, Figure 14) show that HAWKEYEB is sometimes significantly slower than UAFUZZ (2×). This is mainly because of the cost of target function trace closure calculation on large examples with many functions (cf. §6.3). 
UAFUZZ enjoys both a lightweight instrumentation time
UAF Triage (RQ3)
Protocol. We consider the total number of triaging inputs (number of inputs sent to the triaging step), the triaging inputs rate TIR (ratio between the total number of generated inputs and those sent to triaging) and the total triaging time (time spent within the triaging step). Since other fuzzers cannot identify inputs reaching targets during the fuzzing process, we conservatively analyze all inputs generated by the these fuzzers in the bug triage step (TIR = 1).
Results. Consolidated results are presented in Figure 10 , detailed results in Appendix D, Table 9 and Figure 16 .
• The TIR of UAFUZZ is 9.2% in total (avg: 7.25%, median: 3.14%, best: 0.24%, worst: 30.22%) -sparing up to 99.76% of input seeds for confirmation, and is always less than 9% except for sample mjs; • Figure 16 shows that UAFUZZ spends the smallest amount of time in bug triage, i.e. 75s (avg: 6s, min: 1s, max: 24s) for a total speedup of 17× over AFLGOB (max: 130×, avg: 39×).
UAFUZZ reduces a large portion (i.e., more than 90%) of triaging inputs in the post-processing phase. Subsequently, UAFUZZ only spends several seconds in this step, winning an order of magnitude compared to standard directed fuzzers.
Individual Contribution (RQ4)
Protocol. We compare four different versions of our prototype, representing a continuum between AFLGO and UA-FUZZ: (1) the basic AFLGO represented by AFLGOB, (2) AFLGOB-ss adds our seed selection metric to AFLGOB, (3) AFLGOB-ds adds the UAF-based function distance to AFLGOB-ss, and finally (4) UAFUZZ adds our dedicated power schedule to AFLGOB-ds. We consider the previous RQ1 metrics: number of success runs, TTE and Vargha-Delaney. Our goal is to assess whether or not these technical improvements do lead to fuzzing performance improvements.
Results. Consolidated results for success runs and TTE are represented in Figure 11 . Appendix E includes detailed results plus Vargha-Delaney metric (Table 10) . As summarized in Figure 11 , we can observe that each new component does improve both TTE and number of success Figure 11 : Impact of each components (RQ4) runs, leading indeed to fuzzing improvement. Detailed results in Table 10 withÂ 12 values show the same clear trend.
The UAF-based distance computation, the power scheduling and the seed selection heuristic individually contribute to improve fuzzing performance, and combining them yield even further improvements, demonstrating their interest and complementarity.
Patch Testing & Zero-days
Patch testing is another key practical application of DGF [25, 28, 59] . The idea is to use bug stack traces of known UAF bugs to guide testing on the patched version of the PUT -instead of the buggy version as in bug reproduction. The benefit from the bug hunting point of view [18] is both to try finding buggy or incomplete patches and to focus testing on a priori fragile parts of the code, possibly discovering bugs unrelated to the patch itself. How to. We follow bug hunting practice [18] . Starting from the recent publicly disclosed UAF bugs of open source programs, we manually identify addresses of relevant call instructions in the reported bug stack traces since the code has been evolved. We focus on 3 widely-used, security-critical programs that have been well fuzzed and maintained by the developers, namely GNU patch, GPAC and Perl 5 (737K lines of C code and 5 known bug traces in total). Results. Overall UAFUZZ has found and reported 5 new UAF bugs and 15 new bugs from different bug classes in GNU patch, GPAC and Perl 5 (details in Appendix F, Table 11 ). All of them have been acknowledged and 14 out of 20 have been fixed by the vendors. Interestingly, the bug found in GNU patch was actually a buggy patch (Appendix F).
UAFUZZ has been proven effective in a patch testing setting, allowing to find 20 unknown vulnerabilities in 3 widely-used, security-critical programs.
Threats to Validity
Implementation. Our prototype is implemented as part of the binary-level code analysis framework BINSEC [34, 35] , whose efficiency and robustness have been demonstrated in prior large scale studies on both adversarial code and managed code [22, 33, 63] , and on top of the popular fuzzer AFL-QEMU. Effectiveness and correctness of UAFUZZ have been assessed on several bug traces from real programs, as well as on small samples from the Juliet Test Suite. All reported UAF bugs have been manually checked.
Benchmark. Our benchmark is built on both real codes and real bugs, and encompass several bugs found by recent fuzzing techniques of well-known open source codes (including all UAF bugs found by directed fuzzers). It is currently the best available benchmark for UAF fuzzing, cf. Table 5 .
Competitors. We consider the best state-of-the-art techniques in directed fuzzing, namely AFLGO [25] and HAWKEYE [28] . Unfortunately, HAWKEYE is not available and AFLGO works on source code only. Thus, we choose to re-implement these technologies in our own framework for binary-level fuzzing. We followed the available information (article, source code when available) as close as possible, and did our best to get precise implementations of both technologies. Again, these implementations have been checked on real programs and small samples, and the comparison against AFLGO source ( §6.3) demonstrates that our own AFLGO implementation is in line with the original one. Interestingly, this allows comparing very close implementations with a strong control of the different parameters at hand.
Related Work
Directed Greybox Fuzzing. AFLGO [25] and HAWK-EYE [28] have already been discussed. LOLLY [49] provides a lightweight instrumentation to measure the sequence basic block coverage of inputs, yet, at the price of a large runtime overhead. SEEDEDFUZZ [71] seeks to generate a set of initial seeds that improves directed fuzzing performance. SEMFUZZ [74] leverages vulnerability-related texts such as CVE reports to guide fuzzing. 1DVUL [59] discovers 1-day vulnerabilities via binary patches.
UAFUZZ is the first directed fuzzer tailored to UAF bugs, and one of the very few [59] able to handle binary code.
Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing. AFL [1] is the seminal coverage-guided greybox fuzzer. Substantial efforts have been conducted in the last few years to improve over it [26, 40, 46] . Also, many efforts have been fruitfully invested in combining fuzzing with other approaches, such as static analysis [40, 47] , dynamic taint analysis [29, 30, 62] , symbolic execution [58, 68, 76] or machine learning [41, 66] .
Our technique is orthogonal to all these improvements, they could be reused within UAFUZZ as is. UAF Detection. Precise static UAF detection is difficult. GUEB [12] is the only binary-level static analyzer for UAF. The technique can be combined with dynamic symbolic execution to generate PoC inputs [38] , yet with scalability is- sues. On the other hand, several UAF source-level static detectors exist, based on abstract interpretation [32] , pointer analysis [72] , pattern matching [57] , model checking [44] or demand-driven pointer analysis [69] . A common weakness of all static detectors is their inability to infer triggering inputthey rather prove their absence. Dynamic UAF detectors mainly rely on heavyweight instrumentation [9, 27, 55] and result in high runtime overhead, even more for closed source programs. ASan [65] performs lightweight instrumentation, but at source level only. UAF Fuzzing Benchmark. While the Juliet Test Suite [56] (CWE-415, CWE-416) 8 contains only too small programs, existing widely-used fuzzing benchmarks [7, 11, 17, 36, 64] comprise only very few UAF bugs. Moreover, many of these benchmarks contain either artificial bugs [7, 17, 36, 64] or artifical programs [56] .
We construct a new benchmark dedicated to UAF bugs, featuring 12 real codes and 14 real bugs, plus detailed information for fuzzing evaluation (cf. Table 4 ).
Conclusion
UAFUZZ is the first directed greybox fuzzing approach tailored to detecting UAF vulnerabilities (in binary) given only the bug stack trace. By specializing standard directed greybox fuzzing components to UAF, UAFUZZ outperforms existing directed fuzzers, both in terms of time to bug exposure and number of successful runs. Our technique also enjoys only a small overhead and significantly speeds up the bug triage step. UAFUZZ has been proven effective in both bug reproduction and patch testing, leading to the discovery of 20 new bugs in GNU Patch, GPAC and Perl 5 -all bugs found have been acknowledged by developers and 14 have been fixed. A UAF Fuzzing Benchmark Table 5 provides additional details about our UAF fuzzing benchmark [19] including program executables under test, buggy commits and fuzzing configurations (test driver, seeds and timeout).
B UAF Bug-reproducing Ability (RQ1)
We present in this section additional results regarding RQ1, including more detailed experimental reports and the indepth discussion of two notable bugs: yasm-issue-91 and CVE-2017-10686 of nasm. Experimental results. Table 6 summarizes the fuzzing performance (details in Table 8 ) of 4 binary-based fuzzers against our benchmark by providing the total number of covered paths, the total number of success runs and the max/min/average/median values of Factor andÂ 12 . Table 7 compares our fuzzer UAFUZZ with several variants of directed fuzzers AFLGO. Figure 18 provides boxplot representation of results. Zoom on two bugs. We discuss the case of yasm-issue-91, where in all 10 runs, UAFUZZ needs only in a few seconds to reproduce the bug, thus gains a speedup of 43× over the second best tool AFLGOB with a high confidence (i.e.,Â 12 is 1 against other fuzzers). Figure 12 depicts the fuzzing queue of our fuzzer UAFUZZ for the case study in one run. We can see that our seed selection heuristic first selects the most promising inputs among the set of initial test suite (i.e., the most left circle point). As this input also has the biggest cut-edge score among the initial seeds, UAFUZZ spends enough long time to mutate this input and thus eventually discovers the first potential input whose execution trace is similar to the expected trace. Then, two first potential inputs covering in sequence all 19 targets are selected to be mutated by UAFUZZ during fuzzing. Consequently, UAFUZZ could trigger the bug at the third potential input (i.e., the 954th input in the fuzzing queue). Overall in 10 runs the first bug-triggering input of UAFUZZ is the 1019th on average, while for AFL-QEMU and AFLGOB they detect the bug much slower, at the 2026th and 1908th input respectively. The main reason is that other tools spend more time on increasing the code coverage by going through all initial seeds in the fuzzing queue. In particular, as AFLGOB aims to first explore more paths in the exploration phase, it is more likely that directed fuzzers that are mainly based on the seed distance metric like AFLGOB skip or select the input after long time. Although both AFL-QEMU and AFLGOB could find the bug in 8 and 10 runs and discover substantially more paths than our fuzzer, the TTE values of these tools are clearly much more larger than UAFUZZ's TTE.
Another interesting case study illustrating the effectiveness of our technique is CVE-2017-10686 of the program nasm [40] . When assembling the input text file, nasm converts each line into tokens that are allocated in function new_token and then freed in function detoken to detokenize the line and emit it. However, the buggy version of nasm also frees token's text even when the text has not been modified before, causing the UAF bug. While UAFUZZ found the UAF bug in all 10 runs, AFL-QEMU and AFLGOB only produced the bug-triggering input in 1 and 3 runs respectively. Overall UAFUZZ significantly outperforms other fuzzers and achieves a strong confidence of being faster (Â 12 is 0.99 against AFLGOB and 1 against the rest). Specifically, UAFUZZ saves roughly 10,000s to reproduce this bug. Fuzzing Queue Target Similar Metric Score
Initial Inputs
Fuzzed Inputs Selected Inputs Figure 12 : Fuzzing queue of UAFUZZ for yasm-issue-91. Selected inputs to be mutated are highlighted in brown. Potential inputs are in the horizontal dashed line.
C UAF Overhead (RQ2)
We provide additional results for RQ2. Figure 13 , Figure 14 compare the average instrumentation time between UAFUZZ and the source-based directed fuzzer AFLGO and two binarybased directed fuzzers (AFLGOB and HAWKEYEB) respectively. Figure 15 shows the total execution done of AFL-QEMU and UAFUZZ for each subject in our benchmark. 
D UAF Triage (RQ3)
We provide additional results for RQ3: Figure 16 and Table 9 shows the average triaging time and number of triaging inputs (including TIR values for UAFUZZ) of 4 fuzzers against our benchmark. 
E Individual Contribution (RQ4)
We provide additional results for RQ4. Table 10 shows the fuzzing performance of 2 AFLGOB-based variants AFLGOB-ss and AFLGOB-ds compared to AFLGOB and our tool UAFUZZ against our benchmark.
F Patch Testing & Zero-days
We provide additional results for patch testing (Table 11) , as well as a detailed discussion on the GNU Patch buggy patch.
Zoom: GNU Patch buggy patch. We use CVE-2018-6952 [6] to demonstrate the effectiveness of UAFUZZ in exposing unknown UAF vulnerabilities. GNU patch [10] takes a patch file containing a list of differences and applies them to the original file. Listing 3 shows the code fragment of CVE-2018-6952 which is a double free in the latest version 2.7.6 of GNU patch. Interestingly, by using the stack trace of this CVE as shown in Figure 17 , UAFUZZ successfully discovered an incomplete bug fix [8] in the latest commit 76e7758, with a slight difference of the bug stack trace (i.e., the call of savebuf() in another_hunk()).
Technically, GNU patch takes an input patch file containing multiple hunks (line 3) that are split into multiple strings us- Table 9 : Average number of triaging inputs of 4 fuzzers against our tested subjects. For UAFUZZ, the TIR values are in parentheses. ing special characters as delimiter via *buf in the switch case (line 14). GNU patch then reads and parses each string stored in p_line that is dynamically allocated on the memory using malloc() in savebuf() (line 26) until the last line of this hunk has been processed. Otherwise, GNU patch deallocates the most recently processed string using free() (line 10). Our reported bug and CVE-2018-6952 share the same free and use event, but have a different stack trace leading to the same alloc event. Actually, while the PoC input generated by UAFUZZ contains two characters '!', the PoC of CVE-2018-6952 does not contain this character, consequently the case in line 16 was previously uncovered, and thus this CVE had been incompletely fixed. This case study shows the importance of producing different unique bug-triggering inputs to favor the repair process and help complete bug fixing. 
